University of Miami Business Law Review
Volume 30

Issue 3

Article 5

May 2022

FTC v. Qualcomm and the Need to Reboot Antitrust Goals
Beatriz Del Chiaro da Rosa

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umblr
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons

Recommended Citation
Beatriz Del Chiaro da Rosa, FTC v. Qualcomm and the Need to Reboot Antitrust Goals, 30 U. MIA Bus. L.
Rev. 267 (2022)
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umblr/vol30/iss3/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Business Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please
contact library@law.miami.edu.

FTC v. Qualcomm and the Need to Reboot
Antitrust Goals
By: Beatriz Del Chiaro da Rosa
ABSTRACT
The antitrust community is facing a demanding question: Is
antitrust enforcement ultimately about protecting consumers,
competition, or both? This question has sparked debates about the
ultimate goals of antitrust law. On one side of the debate,
supporters of the consumer welfare standard; and on the other
side, supporters of the Neo-Brandeisian standard of enforcement.
At this crucial time in the debate of overarching antitrust goals,
the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Federal Trade Commission v.
Qualcomm Incorporated, one of the most important antitrust
cases in the twenty-first century, poses many issues for the
consumer welfare standard and antitrust enforcement in the
future.
Qualcomm Incorporated (“Qualcomm”) is part of a multi-billiondollar industry as a dominant supplier of baseband processors
and a licensor of patents which enable communications in cell
phones and tablets. The Federal Trade Commission brought a
case against Qualcomm in response to alleged unreasonable
restraints on competition and an unlawful maintenance of a
monopoly. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s
judgment against Qualcomm, and instead found, among other
things, that harm to consumers is outside the relevant market in
analyzing an antitrust violation. The Ninth Circuit’s exclusion of
consumers from an analysis of anticompetitive harm deviates from
established precedent and has already caused a ripple effect
distancing antitrust enforcement from its established goals and
standards.
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Qualcomm’s business practices in question in this case implicate
technology present in the daily lives of most U.S. consumers. In
reversing the district court’s holding, the Ninth Circuit
misunderstood and misapplied fundamental principles of
established antitrust law in reasoning that Qualcomm’s conduct
“involves potential harm to customers, not its competitors, and
thus falls outside the relevant markets.” This grave error is
contrary to fundamental principles of antitrust law and could have
significant implications by narrowing the interpretation of the
Sherman Act for the foreseeable future.
This note addresses the current debate about the ultimate goals of
antitrust law, mainly focusing on the Consumer Welfare and the
Neo-Brandeisian standards of antitrust enforcement. The lack of
clarity and cohesion in antitrust debates about the goals of
antitrust have rendered the realm vulnerable to judicial decisions,
such as FTC v. Qualcomm, that misapply and misinterpret
antitrust standards. This note delineates a potential solution for
the lack of clarity as a call to the courts and academics to improve
discourse by viewing the protection of consumers and competition
as fundamental to antitrust enforcement.
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PART I: INTRODUCTION
Antitrust aficionados are currently at a crossroads: stand guard with
the accepted consumer welfare standard of antitrust enforcement, or, join
forces with critics in arguing for a competition-oriented standard based on
Neo-Brandeisian ideals. The lack of consensus in the antitrust realm has
generated confusion in application of both standards. This absence of
clarity is apparent in FTC v. Qualcomm, a leading patent technology case
in which the Ninth Circuit panel determined that Qualcomm’s activity
“involves potential harms to Qualcomm’s customers, not its competitors,
and thus falls outside the relevant antitrust markets.”1 This is directly
contrary to established antitrust theory which holds consumer welfare as a
fundamental goal of antitrust law.2
It is common to say that antitrust has embraced a single standard:
consumer welfare. However, the consumer welfare standard requires an
analysis of two prongs: the impact of the challenged conduct on
competition; and the impact of the challenged conduct on consumers.3 The
Ninth Circuit panel incorrectly applied the consumer welfare standard by
solely focusing on the impact that the challenged conduct has on
competition in the market.4 Although impact on competition is one of the
prongs which must be analyzed when conducting a Sherman Act Section
2 analysis, it is not the only consideration which antitrust enforcement
must contemplate.5 The panel improperly neglected to contemplate the
impact of the challenged conduct on consumers.6
The misnomer of “consumer welfare” has generated significant
distress in antitrust law.7 Although the standard has been historically
1

FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., 969 F.3d 974, 1002 (9th Cir. 2020).
See generally Brief of 46 Amici Curiae Law and Economics Scholars in Support in
Support of Petition for Rehearing En Banc, at 13, FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., 969 F.3d 974,
982 (9th Cir. 2020) (No. 19-16122) (citing Lucas v. Citizens Commc’ns Co., 244 F. App’x
774, 776 (9th Cir. 2007)) [hereinafter Amicus Brief].
3
See, e.g. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979); Brunswick Corp. v.
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis
added) (stating “[t]he antitrust laws, however, were enacted for ‘the protection
of competition, not competitors . . . .’”) (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. U.S., 370 U.S., at 320
(1962)).
4
See Qualcomm Inc., 969 F.3d at 1002.
5
See, e.g. Reiter, 442 U.S. at 343; Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. at 488.
6
See, e.g. Reiter, 442 U.S. at 343; Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. at 488.
7
See, e.g. Lina M. Khan, The End of Antitrust History Revisited, 133 HARV. L. REV.
1655, 1656 (2020) (reviewing TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW
GILDED AGE (2018)).
2
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adopted as a guiding principle in antitrust enforcement,8 many critics of
the consumer welfare principle have argued that harm to competition
should be the primary focus of antitrust enforcement.9 Antitrust policy is
currently navigating between two extremes of the ideological spectrum.10
On one end of the spectrum is Robert Bork’s consumer welfare approach.11
On the other end of the ideological spectrum is the Neo-Brandeisian
approach, which argues that “the current theory of antitrust” is the major
concern.12
This Note will dive into the current antitrust discourse pertaining to
the goals of antitrust enforcement by shinning a light on the lack of clarity
that clouds antitrust enforcement today. Part II of this Note will address
current antitrust enforcement and the case details of FTC. v. Qualcomm in
the light of current antitrust discussion about the goals of antitrust law. In
highlighting the judicial error present in the Ninth Circuit panel’s holding,
Part III of this Note will provide history and context about the goals of
antitrust, focusing on the consumer welfare and the Neo-Brandeisian
standards of antitrust enforcement, and introduce what that dialogue
amounts to today. Part IV of this note will discuss the errors in the Ninth
Circuit’s holding, and lay pavement for what this author believes is a
possible solution to the current divide in antitrust enforcement as a call for
clarity in the hopes of avoiding disastrous results from improperly applied
standards of enforcement. In fact, the FTC v. Qualcomm decision has
already influenced subsequent decisions in deviating even further from the
consumer welfare standard.13 Instead of crossing swords over whether
protecting consumers or protecting competition is more important, why
not consider both?

8

See generally Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605
(1985) (stating that “ . . . it is relevant to consider its impact on consumers and whether it
has impaired competition in an unnecessarily restrictive way.”).
9
See Khan, supra note 7.
10
See Herbert Hovenkamp, Is Antitrust’s Consumer Welfare Principle Imperiled?, 45 J.
CORP. L. 101, 102 (2019).
11
Id. at 103.
12
See Khan, supra note 7, at 1676.
13
See, e.g. Brief of Apple Inc. As Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant and
Reversal, at 31 Regarding Cont’l Auto. Sys. v. Avanci, 485 F. Supp. 3d 712 (N.D. Tex.
Sept. 10, 2020) (stating “[t]he district court’s flawed decision here can be traced directly
to the DOJ’s misplaced efforts to curtail the application of antitrust law to patents are
embraced in the Ninth Circuit’s Qualcomm decision” in an Amicus Curiae Brief which
addresses how this deviation impacts the consumer welfare standard).
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PART II: ANTITRUST POLICY SETTING THE STAGE FOR FTC V.
QUALCOMM
The framers of the Sherman Act have allowed the courts to shape
antitrust policy as needed to fulfill the goals of antitrust law.14 The
consensus in antitrust policy has been that the courts must balance the
procompetitive justifications with the anticompetitive harms in evaluating
claims of anticompetitive conduct.15 In evaluating anticompetitive harm,
harm to consumers has long been accepted as relevant and has therefore
been considered by courts.16 However this consensus has been challenged,
requiring a reexamination into the goals and standards of antitrust law.
Before we can look to the future of antitrust policy, we must look to the
background and the formation of the policy as it stands today. In this
section, this Note sets the stage for current antitrust enforcement, and
discusses the case details of FTC v. Qualcomm.

A. Antitrust Law and Monopolization: Increasing Brightness on a
Poorly Lit Area of Antitrust Enforcement
Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it is illegal to “monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations . . . .”17 To successfully establish a
claim under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, a plaintiff must show that (1)
the defendant has “monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the
willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from
growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business
acumen, or historic accident.”18 Therefore, merely having monopoly
power is not sufficient to be a violation of Sherman Act Section 2 if such
power is a result of effectively engaging in market competition. 19 One
violates the Sherman Act when it acquires or maintains, or attempts to
acquire or maintain, a monopoly by engaging in exclusionary conduct.20
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT UNDER
SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT (2008).
15
Michael A. Carrier, The Four-Step Rule of Reason, 33 Antitrust 50, 50–51 (2019).
16
See, e.g. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605
(1985) (stating that “ . . . it is relevant to consider its impact on consumers and whether it
has impaired competition in an unnecessarily restrictive way.”).
17
15 U.S.C. § 2.
18
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
19
See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945) (Hand,
J.) (“The successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon
when he wins.”).
20
See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (2001) (stating “[a] firm
violates § 2 only when it acquires or maintains, or attempts to acquire or maintain, a
14
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The Sherman Act attempts to create and to preserve a competitive market
by banning unlawful and exclusionary conduct which results in the
acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power.21
The framers of Section 2 of the Sherman Act did not include a
definition of “monopolization” and instead left it undefined and with little
guidance as to what amounts to prohibited conduct.22 Instead of providing
clear delineations and definitions, Congress furnished an Act with “a
generality and adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in
constitutional provisions . . . .”23
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive
charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and
unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests on the
premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive
forces will yield the best allocation of our economic
resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the
greatest material progress . . . .24
Congress “expected the courts to give shape to the statute’s broad
mandate by drawing on the common-law tradition” while keeping in mind
the statute’s goals.25
Courts have consistently shaped antitrust prosecution by evolving as
issues arise. For example, consider the shifts from per se illegality to a rule
of reason approach to analysis. Per se illegality was the common form of
analysis during most of the mid-twentieth century.26 Under that approach
certain types of conduct, such as horizontal price fixing and horizontal
market allocation, are deemed per se illegal and thus a violation of antitrust
laws.27 Although the rule of reason approach had been formalized since
the early 1900s in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 28 in 1918, the
monopoly by engaging in exclusionary conduct “as distinguished from growth or
development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic
accident.”) (quoting Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 571).
21
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT UNDER
SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT (2008), (stating “Section 2 achieves this end by
prohibiting conduct that results in the acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power,
thereby preserving a competitive environment that gives firms incentives to spur economic
growth.”).
22
Id. (citations omitted).
23
Id. (quoting Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 360 (1933)).
24
Id. (quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958)).
25
Id. (quoting Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978)).
26
Carrier, supra note 15, at 50.
27
Id.
28
See generally Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 66 (1911) (stating “[i]f
the criterion by which it is to be determined in all cases whether every contract,
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Supreme Court recognized a need for a more comprehensive analysis of
possible antitrust violations in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States.29
A Rule of Reason analysis is a burden-shifting framework containing four
steps.30 First, the plaintiff must show a significant anticompetitive effect.31
Second, the burden shifts to the defendant to provide a procompetitive
justification.32 Third, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that
the defendant’s proffered procompetitive justification is not reasonably
necessary to achieve the desired effects.33 Fourth, the court balances the
anticompetitive effects and procompetitive justifications.34 In the 1970s,
the Court shifted focus from looking at specific categories of conduct to
also conducting an economic analysis.35
Depending on the approach that courts take in evaluating and
balancing the anticompetitive effects with the procompetitive
justifications, the impact can be monumental not only for the parties of the
cases but also in establishing precedent for future cases.36 However, with
the lack of established and unified ideals of the true purpose of antitrust,
courts, like the Ninth Circuit panel in FTC v. Qualcomm, have deviated
drastically from established precedent by misapplying or
misunderstanding antitrust standards. This has led to tenuous holdings and
ultimately contributes to the lack of understanding surrounding the goals
of antitrust law.

B. FTC v. Qualcomm: A Tangled Web of Antitrust Standards
1. Qualcomm’s Market Structure
Qualcomm is a leading cellular technology company which has made
several important contributions to technological innovations in the world
of modern cellular systems.37 Some of Qualcomm’s contributions have
included third-generation (“3G”) CDMA and fourth-generation (“4G”)
combination, etc., is a restraint of trade within the intendment of the law, is the direct or
indirect effect of the acts involved, then of course the rule of reason becomes the guide,
and the construction which we have given the statute, instead of being refuted by the cases
relied upon, is by those cases demonstrated to be correct.”).
29
Carrier, supra note 15, at 50.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 50-51.
34
Id. at 51.
35
Id. at 50.
36
See, e.g. Michael Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect, 1999
BYU L. REV. 1265, 1266–67 (1999) (finding empirically that defendants win 96% of rule
of reason cases).
37
FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., 969 F.3d 974, 982 (9th Cir. 2020).
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LTE cellular standards, which are used in most modern cellphones and
cellular devices commonly known as “smartphones.”38 Qualcomm utilizes
patents to protect and consequently profit from the innovations.39
Qualcomm then licenses to original equipment manufacturers (“OEMs”)
whose products utilize one of Qualcomm’s technologies protected by their
patents.40
As relevant to this case, Qualcomm’s patents include cellular standard
essential patents (“SEPs”), 41 non-cellular SEPs, and non-SEPs. Cellular
SEPs are essential and necessary to practice certain cellular standards.42
Because SEP holders have the power to prevent industry participants from
implementing standards by refusing to license, Standard Setting
Organizations obligate patent holders to agree to license their SEPs on fair,
reasonable and nondiscriminatory (“FRAND”) terms prior to their patents
being incorporated.43 Some of Qualcomm’s patents, SEPs and otherwise,
deal with how cellular devices communicate with 3G and 4G cellular
networks.44 That is, it relates to CDMA and premium LTE technologies.45
Other patents relate to noncellular applications and other cellular
applications, such as multimedia, cameras and more.46 Qualcomm
generally offers “patent portfolio” options in which the customer receives
access to all three types of the patents rather than selling individual
patents.47 Qualcomm profits greatly from this patent business. 48
Qualcomm’s patent portfolios are exclusively licensed at the smartphone
OEM level, and the royalty rates on the CDMA and LTE patent portfolios
are set as a percentage of the end-product sales price.49
Qualcomm also successfully and profitably manufactures and sells
modem chips, which enable cellular devices to practice CDMA and
premium LTE technologies.50 This allows communication across cellular
networks.51 Qualcomm is unique because it is both in the SEP portfolio
38

See id.
Id.
40
Id. (noting that the OEM products usually include cellphones, smart cars, and other
products which include cellular applications).
41
Id. (explaining that “Cellular SEPs are patents on technologies that international
standard-setting organizations (“SSOs”) choose to include in technical standards practiced
by each new generation of cellular technology.”).
42
Id. at 983.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 984.
50
Id. at 983.
51
Id.
39
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market, as well as the modem chip market.52 In the ten-year period of 2006
to 2016, Qualcomm possessed monopoly power in the CDMA modem
chip market, “including over 90% of market share.”53 From 2011 to 2016,
Qualcomm also possessed monopoly power in the premium LTE modem
chip market, “including at least 70% of market share.”54 During these
periods of monopoly power, Qualcomm used its power “to ‘charge
monopoly prices on [its] modem chips.’”55 In 2015 Qualcomm’s market
position started to recede because competitors found ways to successfully
compete.56 However, even with a receding market position, Qualcomm
still maintains approximately a 79% market share of the CDMA modem
chip market, and a 64% share of the premium LTE modem chip market.57
Rival chip manufacturers necessarily practice many of Qualcomm’s
SEPs, and thus Qualcomm offers these rivals “CDMA ASIC Agreements”
in which Qualcomm promises not to assert its patents, and in return, the
rival companies promise not to sell their chips to unlicensed OEMs.58
Qualcomm reinforces these requirements with a “no license, no chips”
policy, under which Qualcomm refuses to sell modem chips to OEMs that
do not also take licenses to practice Qualcomm’s SEPs.59 The court of
appeals characterizes OEMs as Qualcomm’s customers.60
Several of these practices are frequently contested by Qualcomm’s
OEM customers and rival chipmakers, who often complain of
“Qualcomm’s practice of licensing exclusively at the OEM level and
refusing to license rival chipmakers, its licensing royalty rates, its ‘no
license, no chips’ policy, and Qualcomm’s sometimes aggressive defense
of these policies and practices.”61 In January of 2017, the Federal Trade
Commission sued Qualcomm alleging (1) tying in response to Qualcomm
“conditioning the supply of baseband processors on licenses to FRANDencumbered patents”; (2) refusals to deal in response to Qualcomm
“refusing to license FRAND-encumbered patents to baseband processor
competitors”; and (3) exclusive dealing, in response to Qualcomm’s

Id. (noting that “Nokia, Ericsson, and Interdigital have comparable SEP portfolios but
do not compete with Qualcomm on the modem chip markets[,]” and that “Qualcomm’s
main competitors in the modem chip markets . . . MediaTek, HiSilicon, Samsung LSI, STEricsson, and VIA Telecom . . . do not hold or have not held comparable SEP portfolios.”).
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id. (citing FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 658, 800 (N.D. Cal. 2019)).
56
Id. at 983–84.
57
Id. at 984.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 985.
60
Id.
61
Id.
52
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restricted dealing with Apple.62 The FTC’s allegations provide that
Qualcomm’s interrelated policies and business practices excluded
competitors and thus harmed competition in violation of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a), and sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2.63

2. The Merits of Enforcement Against Qualcomm
After lengthy procedures spanning a course of two years, the district
court ruled in favor of the Federal Trade Commission and found that the
Commission properly asserted that Qualcomm violated Sections 1 and 2
of the Sherman Act, and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 64
The court then ruled that since the anticompetitive conduct is ongoing, an
injunction is warranted to prevent more anticompetitive harm. 65
The district court’s findings of fact and law are the result of a full rule
of reason analysis conducted by investigating the anticompetitive conduct
and the impacts.66 The district court emphasized that “anticompetitive
conduct is conduct that ‘harm[s] the competitive process and thereby
harm[s] consumers.’”67 The district court also accentuated that conduct
that solely harms competitors is not enough to be anticompetitive.68 The
district court further elaborated that “‘[a]nticompetitive conduct is
behavior that tends to impair the opportunities of rivals and either does not
further competition on the merits or does so in an unnecessarily restrictive
way.’”69 With this established foundation, the district court dove into a
deep analysis of Qualcomm’s anticompetitive practices.
The district court engaged in a lengthy and detailed discussion
regarding Qualcomm’s anticompetitive practices in patent license
negotiations regarding several OEMs.70 Regarding the anticompetitive
conduct against OEMs allegations, the district court found that Qualcomm
has engaged in substantial anticompetitive conduct.71 As the district court
62

Complaint for Equitable Relief at 31, FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., 969 F.3d 974 (9th Cir.
2020) (No. 17-00220) (ECF. No. 1).
63
FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., 969 F.3d at 986.
64
See id.
65
See FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 658, 813 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
66
See id. at 696-751.
67
Id. at 696 (citing United States v. Microsoft Corp., 346 U.S. App. D.C. 330, 253 F.3d
34, 58 (2001)).
68
Id.
69
Id. (citing Cascade Health Sols. v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 894 (9th Cir. 2008)).
70
See id. (analyzing Qualcomm’s conduct toward “(1) LGE, (2) Sony, (3) Samsung, (4)
Huawei, (5) Motorola, (6) Lenovo, (7) BlackBerry, (8) Curitel, (9) BenQ, (10) Apple, (11)
VIVO, (12) Wistron, (13) Pegatron, (14) ZTE, (15) Nokia, and (16) smaller Chinese
OEMs.”).
71
Id. at 743.
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explained, Qualcomm’s refusal to sell its modem chips to an OEM until
the OEM signed a patent license agreement, and refusal to sell its modem
chips exhaustively, was anticompetitive.72 Qualcomm engaged in conduct
which ultimately ensured that the OEMs would sign Qualcomm’s license
agreements which ultimately resulted in exclusivity.73
The district court further discussed Qualcomm’s refusal to license
standard essential patents (“SEPs”) to competing modem chip suppliers.74
The court held that this practice is anticompetitive because it has prompted
rivals to exit the market, impacted entry into the market, and hindered the
success of competitors.75 Qualcomm’s rivals are threatened because they
cannot sell modem chips without an assurance that Qualcomm will not sue
for patent infringement.76 This conduct also facilitates Qualcomm in
charging unreasonably high royalty rates.77 The district court analyzed in
depth how Qualcomm’s practices impacted market entry, promoted rivals’
entry, and hurt rivals in the relevant market.78
The district court then found that Qualcomm’s FRAND Commitments
required the company to license its modem chip SEPs to rivals, stating that
“Qualcomm’s FRAND commitments to two SSOs79 require Qualcomm to
license its SEPs to rivals.” 80 The district court discussed in detail that
Qualcomm used to license its SEPs to rivals, however, for solely financial
reasons, stopped doing so because licensing its SEPs to OEMs is
significantly “more lucrative.”81 The district court therefore refused to
accept Qualcomm’s allegedly procompetitive justifications for the
conduct of refusing to license to its rivals.82
The district court also analyzed whether Qualcomm has an antitrust
duty to license its SEPs to rival modem chip suppliers under the Sherman
Act.83 The court explained that although there is no general duty to aid

72

See id.
See id.
74
Id. at 744.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
The district court discussed Qualcomm’s (1) 2008 refusal to license MediaTek; (2)
2011 refusal to license Project Dragonfly; (3) 2011 refusal to license Samsung; (4) refusal
to license VIA; (5) 2004 and 2009 refusals to license Intel; (6) 2009 refusal to license
HiSilicon; (7) refusal to license Broadcom; (8) refusal to license Texas Instruments; (9)
2015 refusal to license LGE; and (10) 2009 and 2018 refusals to license Samsung. See id.
at 744–51.
79
SSOs are standard setting organizations. Id. at 669.
80
Id. at 751.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 758.
73

278

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:267

competitors,84 a refusal to cooperate with rivals can oftentimes constitute
anticompetitive conduct and thus violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act.85
In concluding that Qualcomm violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act, the
court analyzed several factors and found the following facts to be relevant:
(1) “Qualcomm terminated a voluntary and profitable course of dealing”,86
(2) Qualcomm’s refusal to license was motivated by anticompetitive
motives;87 and (3) there is an existing market for licensing modem chip
SEPs.88 The court determined these factors were relevant because they
were outlined in Aspen Skiing Company v. Aspen Highlands Skiing
Corporation.89
The district court also explained that Qualcomm’s exclusive deals
with Apple, including the 2011 Transition Agreement (“TA”) and the 2013
First Amendment to Transition Agreement (“FATA”), violate the
Sherman Act.90 The court reasoned that the TA and FATA allowed
Qualcomm to shrink rivals’ sales and prevent rivals from achieving
positive network effects of working with Apple.91 This allowed
Qualcomm to retain monopoly power in these markets and thus sustain
QTL’s unreasonably steep royalty rates.92 The court also determined that
Qualcomm’s exclusive deals with Apple resulted in a foreclosure of a
substantial market share.93
The court concluded that “Qualcomm’s licensing practices have
strangled competition in the CDMA and premium LTE modem chip
markets for years, and harmed rivals, OEMs, and end consumers in the
process.”94 The district court held Qualcomm to be in violation of Section
1 of the Sherman Act because of an unreasonable restraint of trade; and in
violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act because of exclusionary
conduct.95 Since Qualcomm’s actions violate both Sherman Act Section 1
and Section 2, the court found that Qualcomm is liable under the FTC Act,
as violations of the Sherman Act also constitute “unfair methods of

84

Id. (citing Verizon Commc’ns. Inc. v. L. Offs. of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 411 (2004)).
85
Qualcomm, 411 F. Supp. 3d at 758 (citing Trinko, 540 U.S. at 411).
86
Qualcomm, 411 F. Supp. 3d at 759.
87
Id. at 760.
88
Id. at 762.
89
Id.; see Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
90
Qualcomm, 411 F. Supp. 3d at 762.
91
Id. at 762.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 766.
94
Id. at 812.
95
Id.
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competition.”96 Injunctive relief was granted and judgment was entered in
favor of the plaintiff.97
The district court properly analyzed the Federal Trade Commission’s
allegations, and addressed such allegations by considering Qualcomm’s
market power98 and the impact of the anticompetitive conduct on
competition and on consumers.99 Qualcomm’s conduct “unfairly tends to
destroy competition itself.”100 Defendant, Qualcomm, appealed the district
court’s decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

3. Ninth Circuit: Competition, Confusion, Chips
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel vacated the district court’s
judgment and subsequently reversed the worldwide injunction the district
court had placed prohibiting many of Qualcomm’s business practices.101
The court of appeals held that “the district court went beyond the scope of
the Sherman Act . . . “ and reversed the judgment.102
After a thorough description of antitrust laws as they pertain to Section
1 and Section 2 of the Sherman Act, the court of appeals emphasized the
importance of accurately defining the relevant market, which refers to
“‘the area of effective competition.’”103 The court of appeals
acknowledged that the district court properly defined Qualcomm’s
relevant markets as “‘the market for CDMA modem chips and the market
for premium LTE modem chips.’”104
Although the panel agreed with the district court’s definition of
Qualcomm’s relevant market, the panel disagreed with the district court’s
analysis.105 The court of appeals determined that the district court’s
anticompetitive impact analysis looked beyond the market definition, and
instead considered a much larger and more broad market of general
cellular services.106 In such, the court of appeals specified that a substantial
portion of the lower court’s ruling had relied on alleged economic harm to
OEMs.107 The panel considered OEMs to be Qualcomm’s customers, not
its competitors, and thus was troubled by the district court’s consideration

96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107

Id. at 812 (citing F.T.C. v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 693–94 (1948)).
Qualcomm, 411 F. Supp. 3d at 820.
See generally id. at 683-95.
See id. at 812.
Id. (citing Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993)).
F.T.C. v. Qualcomm Inc., 969 F.3d 974, 982 (9th Cir. 2020).
Id.
Id. at 992 (quoting Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2285 (2018)).
Qualcomm 969 F.3d at 982 (quoting Qualcomm, 411 F. Supp. 3d at 683).
See Qualcomm, 969 F.3d at 982.
Id.
Id.at 992.
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of economic harm to OEMs.108 The court of appeals therein stated that the
harms to OEMs “are not ‘anticompetitive’ in the antitrust sense—at least
not directly—because they do not involve restraints on trade or
exclusionary conduct in ‘the area of effective competition.’”109 The court
of appeals subsequently criticized the district court’s analysis and framing
of the issues. In a concerning interpretation of antitrust law, the court of
appeals stated that “ . . . actual or alleged harms to customers and
consumers outside the relevant markets are beyond the scope of antitrust
law.”110 After conducting a reframed analysis of the issues, and excluding
OEMs from the relevant market,111 the court of appeals determined that
the Federal Trade Commission did not meet its burden as a plaintiff under
the rule of reason in demonstrating that Qualcomm’s business practices
have crossed the line to constitute “‘conduct which unfairly tends to
destroy competition itself.’”112
In making this conclusion, the court of appeals first provided that
Qualcomm’s practice of exclusively licensing its SEPs at the OEM level
did violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act because Qualcomm does not have
a duty to license to rival chip suppliers.113 The court of appeals then
provided that Qualcomm’s patent-licensing royalties and the “no license,
no chips” policy do not undermine competition and are instead chipsupplier neutral.114 Lastly, the court of appeals panel determined that
Qualcomm’s 2011 and 2013 agreements with Apple did not foreclose
competition and noted that these agreements were voluntarily terminated
by Apple a significant amount of time prior to this proceeding against
Qualcomm.115 The court of appeals thus reversed the district court’s
judgment and vacated the injunction.116
Although the court of appeals agreed with the district court’s
definition of the relevant market, therein adopting the same definition in
its own reasoning, the court of appeals rendered a judgement directly
opposing the district court’s holding.117 The Ninth Circuit panel
conveniently turned a blind eye to landmark cases which delineated that it

108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117

See id.
Id. (quoting Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2285 (2018)).
Id. at 993.
See generally id. at 993–1005.
Id. at 1005 (quoting Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See generally id. at 992.
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is appropriate to examine the impact on consumers when analyzing a
Sherman Act Section 2 violation.118
By failing to consider price impacts on Qualcomm’s consumers, the
Ninth Circuit disregarded established precedent, specifically including
statements by the Supreme Court in Reiter v. Sonotone Corporation.119
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit’s holding creates a slippery slope for
monopolists to dodge antitrust liability if they are able to “exclude rivals
through customer-oriented acts.”120 In fact, industry participants have
pointed to subsequent judicial decisions as being influenced by the Ninth
Circuit’s holdings in FTC v. Qualcomm.121 The Ninth Circuit’s decision
also shines a spotlight on the lack of clarity about the fundamental goals
of antitrust law, and ultimately, about the proper application of the
consumer welfare standard. Although the panel deviated from precedent
in failing to consider impact to consumers as relevant in determining a
Sherman Act violation, the Ninth Circuit panel is not to blame for the
confusion surrounding the goals of antitrust law.122 Instead, this author
believes the cause for such confusion is the lack of clarity in the ongoing
debate over fundamental antitrust goals.

PART III: CURRENT DEBATE: DISCONNECTED DIALOGUE AND
DISCOURSE
In highlighting two extremes on the ideological spectrum of the
debate, namely the consumer welfare standard and the Neo-Brandeisian
standard, this Note addresses key concerns of supporters of each side. This
section examines the current debate over the overarching goals of antitrust
policy, emphasizing the disconnect between the actions of those ready to
criticize the opposing view, but that fail to listen to the critiques directed
at their own view. This section also addresses common issues in the

See Amicus Brief, supra note 2, at 7 (stating “‘[i]t is, accordingly, appropriate to
examine the effect of the challenged pattern of conduct on consumers’ when evaluating a
Section 2 claim”) (first quoting Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472
U.S. 585, 605 (1985); and then citing cf. Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1519, 1525
(2019) (customers paying higher prices suffer antitrust injury under Section 2)).
119
See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp. 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (citing ROBERT H. BORK, THE
ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 66 (1978)).
120
Amicus Brief, supra note 2, at 13.
121
See, e.g., Brief of Apple Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant and
Reversal at 31, Cont’l Auto. Sys., Inc. v. Avanci, L.L.C., 485 F. Supp. 3d 712 (N.D. Tex.
2020) (No. 19-cv-02933) (“The district court’s flawed decision here can be traced directly
to the DOJ’s misplaced efforts to curtail the application of antitrust law to patents are
embraced in the Ninth Circuit’s Qualcomm decision.”).
122
See infra Part III and Part IV.
118
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debate, including that competition and consumers are talked about
separately too frequently.

A. Current Dialogue: Market Competition, Consumers, and
General Goals of Antitrust
The lack of harmony in the antitrust community has caused a lack of
clearness in applying any standard because different standards can yield
different results. If the ultimate goal of antitrust is undefined, a lack of
consensus in the application of standards in analyzing potential antitrust
violations will certainly result.
Market competition provides various benefits to the economy and to
consumers because it pushes companies to reduce costs and to improve the
quality of their products.123 It also stimulates new product designs and
increases consumer education.124 Competition ultimately results in
increased consumer welfare.125 The Antitrust Modernization Commission
reported to Congress in 2007 that “‘the state of antitrust laws’ was
‘sound’”126 and concluded that “the existing statutes were sufficiently
flexible to address emerging issues, and that courts, antitrust agencies, and
practitioners were now in proper agreement that ‘consumer welfare’ was
the ‘unifying goal of antitrust law.’”127
Courts have historically considered consumer welfare as a leading
concern in evaluating possible antitrust violations. 128 In evaluating a
Sherman Act Section 2 claim, “[i]t is . . . appropriate to examine the effect
of the challenged pattern of conduct on consumers.”129 However, in recent
years, there has been a rift over the goals, purposes, and values of antitrust
law.130 During the last ten years, some professionals in the antitrust field
have grown skeptical and critical of the consumer welfare standard and of

U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT UNDER
SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 7 (2008), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/
legacy/2009/05/11/236681.pdf.
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Khan, supra note 7, at 1655 (citing ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N,
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2007), https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_
recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf).
127
Khan, supra note 7, at 1655 (citing ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS at 35).
128
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 (1985) (stating
that “it is relevant to consider its impact on consumers and whether it has impaired
competition in an unnecessarily restrictive way.”).
129
Id.
130
Khan, supra note 7, at 1656.
123
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the effects of increased concentration of the market.131 Although this is not
the first time in antitrust history that the Chicago School has been
challenged,132 the consumer welfare framework, and the dominant
neoclassical principles of the framework, remain the primary source of
antitrust doctrine.133 It is important to note, however, that with the
development and growth of antitrust as a body of law, antitrust policy
under the consumer welfare principle is currently at a crossroads and
navigating between two extremes: Bork’s consumer welfare standard, and
the Neo-Brandeisian approach to antitrust law. The one thing these two
ideological extremes share is that both belittle the importance of increased
outputs and low prices as the fundamental goal of antitrust.134
On one end of the ideological spectrum is Robert Bork’s consumer
welfare approach.135 Bork’s consumer welfare standard has been widely
adopted by courts since its emergence in Bork’s publication The Antitrust
Paradox, in 1978.136 Bork’s use of the terminology “‘consumer welfare’
referred to the sum of the welfare, or surplus, enjoyed by both consumers
and producers.”137 Bork expressed that “[t]he whole task of antitrust can
be summed up as the effort to improve allocative efficiency without
impairing productive efficiency so greatly as to produce either no gain or
a net loss to consumer welfare.”138 Much of Bork’s arguments rely on the
concept that “consumer welfare and efficiency [go] hand in hand—that the
consumer interest was in efficiency.”139 Bork traditionally used the term
131

Id. at 1671; The author, Lina Khan, also points to several examples of publications in
prior years evidencing criticism and skepticism of current antitrust standards. Id. at 1671
n.66 (first citing see, e.g., BARRY C. LYNN, CORNERED: THE NEW MONOPOLY CAPITALISM
AND THE ECONOMICS OF DESTRUCTION (2010); then, e.g., Lina Khan, Obama’s Game of
Chicken, WASH. MONTHLY (Nov. 9, 2012), https://washingtonmonthly.com/
2012/11/09/obamas-game-of-chicken/; then, e.g., Lina Khan & Sandeep Vaheesan, How
America Became Uncompetitive and Unequal, WASH. POST (June 13, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-america-became-uncompetitive-andunequal/2014/06/13/a690ad94-ec00-11e3-b98c-72cef4a00499_story.html; then, e.g.,
Barry C. Lynn, Killing the Competition, HARPER’S MAG. (Feb. 2012),
https://harpers.org/archive/2012/02/killing-the-competition; and then, e.g., Barry C. Lynn
& Phillip Longman, Who Broke America’s Jobs Machine?, WASH. MONTHLY (Mar. 30,
2010), https://washingtonmonthly.com/2010/03/30/who-broke-americas-jobs-machine3/).
132
Id. at 1665 (noting that “the Chicago School has not gone unchallenged . . . .”).
133
See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION
15 (2006).
134
See id.
135
See id.
136
See BORK, supra note 119, at 66, 97 (1978).
137
Hovenkamp, supra note 10, at 65 (quoting BORK, supra note 119, at 90).
138
BORK, supra note 119, at 91.
139
Daniel A. Crane, The Tempting of Antitrust: Robert Bork and the Goals of Antitrust
Policy, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 835, 837 (2014).
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“consumer welfare” to describe something that most economists refer to
as “general welfare” or “total welfare.”140 General welfare, as traditionally
understood by economists, is “welfare that includes the surplus, or wealth
net of costs, enjoyed by everyone affected, including producers and
consumers as well as others.”141 However, most people today view the
consumer welfare principle as encouraging “markets to produce output as
high as is consistent with sustainable competition, and prices that are
accordingly as low.”142 Bork was not concerned with a standard that
favored producers so strongly because in a perfect competition model,
producer gains are leveled away over time and ultimately benefit
consumers.143 The overall goal of the consumer welfare principle is to
“encourage markets in which output, measured by quantity, quality, or
innovation, is as large as possible consistent with sustainable
competition.”144
On the other end of the ideological spectrum is the “Neo-Brandeisian”
approach.145 Critics of Bork’s consumer welfare standard have argued that
“[g]rowing signs that the current approach to antitrust has failed even on
its own terms, then, have created an opening for the Neo-Brandeisian
scholars to revisit foundational questions and make the case for recovering
an approach to antitrust that is rooted in its antimonopoly values.”146 NeoBrandeisian scholars argue that the current antitrust theory is the major
concern.147 Notably, the Neo-Brandeisian approach also views markets to
be fragile and easily susceptible to collusion and monopolization. 148 The
Neo-Brandeisian approach’s main assumption that “individuals in our
society would really be better off in a world characterized by higher prices
but smaller firms” remains relatively untested.149 The Neo-Brandeisian
approach oftentimes considers low prices to be problematic when these
140

Herbert Hovenkamp, On the Meaning of Antitrust’s Consumer Welfare Principle,
REVUE CONCURRENTIALISTE, Jan. 17, 2020, at 1 (stating “Bork, however, used the term
‘consumer welfare’ to describe something that most economists refer to as ‘general
welfare’ or ‘total welfare.’”).
141
Hovenkamp, supra note 10, at 65.
142
Id. at 66 (Noting “[i]f total welfare is to be regarded as the baseline, the [consumer
welfare] principle redistributes a certain amount of wealth away from producers and
towards consumers.”).
143
Id. (citing ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF 98–99 (1978))
144
Id. at 67
145
Id.
146
Khan, supra note 7, at 1676.
147
Id.
148
Hovenkamp, supra note 10, at 67.
149
Id. Hovenkamp explains that “[t]he neo-Brandeisians still face the formidable task of
providing evidence that most citizens believe they would be better off in a world of higher
cost smaller firms selling at higher prices, their market behavior notwithstanding.”
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prices are a result of large firms.150 A general theme of the emerging NeoBrandeisian movement is “greater production for small business, nearly
always at consumers’ expense.”151
Interpreting congressional intent in passing the Sherman Act is no easy
task, and as such has sparked numerous debates since the Sherman Act
was passed.152 These debates are somewhat unavoidable because Congress
did not use the terms “competition” or “competitive process,” and thus did
not define such terms.153 Therefore, it cannot be “obvious that consumer
protection is a superior goal to economic efficiency . . . [nor] that the
welfare of consumers must trump the welfare of society.”154 Although it is
not feasible to delineate the true goal, it is possible to determine that the
dominant goal, which has more widespread support and has been most
relied upon thus far, that being the protection of consumers.155
Case law also supports protection of consumers as the main goal, and
by the 1990s, “most courts had embraced consumer protection . . . .”156
“[W]hen judges address the goals of the antitrust laws in a sell-side case
or defined critical terms like ‘anticompetitive,’ they ordinarily say that
their aim is to prevent injury to consumers . . . .”157 In fact, since 1979,
when the Supreme Court stated that the Sherman Act is a “consumer
welfare prescription”,158 consumer welfare has been the stated goal and
purpose of antitrust laws in the United States.159
However, prior to a widespread acceptance of the consumer welfare
standard, the broad understanding of the goals of antitrust was that
“competition was the original and practical goal of U.S. competition laws,
that is, antitrust.”160 Prior to the acceptance of Bork’s standard, courts also
repeatedly proclaimed that “competition” was the “goal of U.S.

150

Id.
Id.
152
See John B. Kirkwood, The Essence of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers and Small
Suppliers From Anticompetitive Conduct, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2425, 2426–27 (2013).
153
Id. at 2427 (citing PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 101 (rev. ed. 1997) (stating
“The members of Congress who enacted the Sherman Act wanted to preserve
‘competition,’ although they never defined that term . . . .”)).
154
Id. at 2428.
155
Id. at 2428–30 (describing how “[t]he legislative histories of the principal antitrust
laws express more support for this goal than for any other.”).
156
Id. at 2430.
157
Id.
158
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (citing ROBERT H. BORK, THE
ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 66 (1978)).
159
Barak Orbach, How Antitrust Lost Its Goal, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2253, 2254 (2013).
160
Id. at 2255.
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competition laws.161 Since the time when Bork’s consumer welfare
standard was accepted by the courts, courts have not addressed the specific
meanings of the term, and this has resulted in a great amount of
ambiguity.162
This Neo-Brandeisian “effective competition” standard gained force,
with policy-makers and academics calling the replacement of the
Consumer Welfare Standard with the Neo-Brandeisian Effective
Competition Standard.163 Lina Khan, a prominent voice against the

161

Id. at 2270 (referencing, see e.g., City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435
U.S. 389, 398 (1978), which stated “[b]y enacting the Sherman Act] Congress . . . sought
to establish a regime of competition as the fundamental principle governing commerce in
this country.”); United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) (“Antitrust
laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise.
They are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise
system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms. And
the freedom guaranteed each and every business, no matter how small, is the freedom to
compete—to assert with vigor, imagination, devotion, and ingenuity whatever economic
muscle it can muster.”); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963);
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 330 (1962) (“[A]ntitrust laws . . . are
intended primarily to preserve and stimulate competition.”); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (“The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive
charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule
of trade . . . .[T]he policy unequivocally laid down by the Act is competition.”); Standard
Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248–49 (1951) (“The heart of our national economic policy
long has been faith in the value of competition. In the Sherman and Clayton Acts, as well
as in the Robinson-Patman Act, ‘Congress was dealing with competition, which it sought
to protect, and monopoly, which it sought to prevent.’” (quoting A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v.
FTC, 135 F.2d 453, 455 (7th Cir. 1943)); Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S.
231, 238 (1918) (“The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress
or even destroy competition.”); N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 331 (1904)
(“[T]he anti-trust act[] has prescribed the rule of free competition among those engaged in
[interstate] commerce.”)).
162
Orbach, supra note 158, at 2254-55.
163
John M. Newman, Reactionary Antitrust, CONCURRENCES REV., Nov. 2019, at 66–67
(stating “ . . . a handful of academics began to follow suit. Maurice Stucke and Marshall
Steinbaum produced a white paper in 2018 arguing against the consumer welfare standard.
‘It is imperative,’ they wrote, ‘that the consumer welfare standard be replaced, and in this
paper, we present an alternative: the effective competition standard.’”) (citing M.
Steinbaum & M. E. Stucke, The Effective Competition Standard: A New Standard for
Antitrust 1 (2018), http://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/TheEffective-Competition-Standard-FINAL.pdf.); see Marshall Steinbaum & Maurice E.
Stucke, The Effective Competition Standard: A New Standard for Antitrust, 86 U. CHI. L.
REV. 595, 596 (2019) (stating “To tackle today’s market power problem, we offer an
effective competition antitrust standard to replace the prevailing consumer welfare
standard, which courts and scholars have interpreted differently (and at times
inconsistently). The effective competition standard restores the primary aim of the antitrust
laws—namely, the dispersion and deconcentration of significant private power wherever
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consumer welfare standard and in favor of Neo-Brandeisian ideals, has
stated how antitrust law would not be the only area of law that would need
to change for effective enforcement of this type.164 Instead, a “host of other
legal reforms and interventions – including renewing labor law and
protecting workers’ organizations, reinvigorating public utility
regulations, and adopting public options – [would] also be needed to
achieve the antimonopoly goals of rebalancing power and checking private
domination.”165
Consumer welfare supporters would go as far as to argue that
monopolization claims under Section 2 of the Sherman Act that focus
exclusively on competitors and rivals are fundamentally flawed.166 The
Neo-Brandeisians, however, would adamantly disagree with consumerwelfare supporters that focusing exclusively on competitors and rivals is
erroneous.167 The Neo-Brandeisians instead would argue that focusing on
competition itself, rather than on consumers, is the preferred standard in
evaluating monopolization claims.168 This divide among theories of
antitrust has increased movement in the general discussion regarding the
fundamental goal of antitrust law. Ultimately, antitrust enthusiasts are
facing the inquiry: is the goal of antitrust law to protect competition or
consumers or both?

B. Current Discourse: Standstill from a Disconnected Debate
Engaging in scholarly debates about the goals of antitrust enforcement
should not be challenging. After all, those voicing their concerns about the
current state of antitrust deserve to be heard and to have their trepidations
addressed. However, the problem is that neither side truly listens to the
arguments of the other. Unsubstantiated dismissal of productive debates
paired with sustained attacks on antitrust enforcement institutions 169 have
upended the professionalism and respect necessary to productively answer
whether protecting competition or protecting consumers is the ultimate

in the economy it is to be found, including throughout supply chains and in the labor
market.”).
164
See Khan, supra note 7, at 1682.
165
Id.
166
Amicus Brief, supra note 2 at 13 (citing Lucas v. Citizens Commc’ns Co., 244 F.
App’x 774, 776 (9th Cir. 2007)).
167
Steinbaum & Stucke, supra note 163, 601–602.
168
See id.
169
JOINT SUBMISSION OF ANTITRUST ECONOMISTS, LEGAL SCHOLARS, AND
PRACTITIONERS TO THE HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE ON THE STATE OF ANTITRUST LAW
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PROTECTING COMPETITION IN D IGITAL MARKETS (May 15, 2020)
[hereinafter Joint Submission].
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goal of antitrust. Instead, this reactionary and hostile atmosphere has
resulted in proposals for changes to fall on deaf ears.170
A significant problem in the current discourse is that competition and
consumers are talked about separately all too frequently.171 But, in reality,
the consumer welfare standard is not solely about protecting consumers.172
Sometimes it even seems that supporters of the consumer welfare standard
attempt to separate the two yet end up using them both interchangeably.
For example, consider the Joint Submission of Antitrust Economists, Legal
Scholars and Practitioners to the House on the State of Antitrust Law and
Impact on Antitrust and Protecting Competition in Digital Markets.173 In
the title, the authors emphasize “protecting competition” however, in the
arguments, the authors state that “[t]hrough discussion and debate among
jurists, scholars, economists, and government enforcers, antitrust law
adopted a disciplined method of analyzing competition that is guided by a
straightforward question: ‘Is the challenged conduct likely to make
consumers better or worse off?’”174 In support of the consumer welfare
standards, the authors of the aforementioned Joint Submission emphasize
that the implementation of the welfare standard by courts has allowed the
“vague concept of ‘protecting competition’ embodied in the antitrust
laws” to have meaning through common economics.175
Although many argue vehemently that the consumer welfare standard
fulfills its purpose as antitrust enforcement standard, it is not surprising
that some antitrust commentators are calling for reform. Most critiques of
the consumer welfare standard argue that the current standard has failed to
deliver preferred outcomes and that the standard is “ . . . illogical,
paradoxical, or otherwise unworkable.”176 Such critics often point to
empirical studies showing an increase in market concentration in recent

170

See id.
See Sam Bowman, The Consumer Welfare Standard: Bringing Objectivity to
Antitrust, INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR LAW AND ECONOMICS, at 1 (February 2021),
https://laweconcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/tldr-Consumer-WelfareStandard.pdf (stating “[i]n antitrust law, the Consumer Welfare Standard (CWS) directs
courts to focus on the effects that challenged business practices have on consumers, rather
than on alleged harms to specific competitors.”).
172
See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (finding
Microsoft liable for conduct that harmed a rival).
173
Joint Submission, supra note 169.
174
Id. at 5.
175
Id.
176
Newman, supra note 163, at 68 (discussing Rebecca Haw Allensworth who, in an
article in 2016, observed that “neoclassical antitrust discourse all too often glosses over the
tradeoffs that the consumer-welfare analysis necessarily entails.”) (Citing Rebecca Haw
Allensworth, The Commensurability Myth in Antitrust, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1 2016).
171
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years.177 Lina Khan has stated that given the current technology market,
and the “dominance of a small number of technology platforms, certain
aspects of which seem to exhibit natural monopoly features, and the
revival of antitrust as an antiworker tool—recognizing competition as one
among several mechanisms for checking concentrated private power is
especially critical.”178
Some scholars have gone as far as to call for the rejection of the
consumer welfare standard, arguing that it is “theoretically flawed and
unrigorous from the start.”179 Mark Glick, a prominent critic of the
consumer welfare standard, has stated that the welfare standard is
“defective and inappropriate . . . as an antitrust policy goal.”180 These
criticisms have sparked debates and have raised internal critiques that
should be addressed by the proponents of the consumer-welfare
standard.181 The issues raised by critics of the consumer welfare standard
go beyond theoretical implications, and have true repercussions in real
cases.182 John Newman notes that “the need to avoid grappling with these
issues is prompting courts to develop insurmountable hurdles for
plaintiffs.”183 These hurdles are evidenced in FTC v. Qualcomm.

PART IV: FTC V. QUALCOMM AND THE URGENT CALL FOR CLARITY
The Ninth Circuit’s misapplication of antitrust principles in FTC v.
Qualcomm illustrates how the lack of clarity in standards has real-world
repercussions, distancing antitrust enforcement from the long-accepted
consumer welfare standard. This misapplication of standards adds to the
lack of clarity of the goals of antitrust and will impact antitrust
enforcement in the future. This section of this Note provides an analysis
of the lack of consideration of harm to consumers by the Ninth Circuit
Panel. This section also addresses the urgent need for better and more
productive debate to save antitrust enforcement from slipping down the
same slippery slope as the Ninth Circuit in FTC v. Qualcomm.

177

See Khan, supra note 7, at 1671 (reviewing TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS:
ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE (2018)).
178
See id. at 1664.
179
Mark Glick, The Unsound Theory Behind the Consumer (and Total) Welfare Goal in
Antitrust, 63 ANTITRUST BULL. 455, 455 (2018).
180
Newman, supra note 163, at 68.
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A. FTC v. Qualcomm: Misapplied Standards
The Ninth Circuit panel applied an erroneous standard in evaluating
Qualcomm’s business practices, and improperly disregarded the impact of
Qualcomm’s business practices on consumers, generating unclear
precedent which will likely misdirect lower courts.184 The panel
disregarded the district court’s findings of fact and instead determined that
because the “no license no chips” policy possibly harms Qualcomm’s
customers, not its competitors, the policy does not directly impair the
opportunities of Qualcomm’s rivals and therefore does not violate
Sherman Act Section 2.185 The panel acknowledged that the district court
properly defined the relevant markets, however, the panel opinion also
maintains that:
Nevertheless, its analysis of Qualcomm’s business
practices and their anticompetitive impact looked beyond
these markets to the much larger market of cellular
services generally. Thus, a substantial portion of the
district court’s ruling considered alleged economic harms
to OEMs—who are Qualcomm’s customers, not its
competitors—resulting in higher prices to consumers.
These harms, even if real, are not ‘anticompetitive’ in the
antitrust sense—at least not directly—because they do not
involve restraints on trade or exclusionary conduct in ‘the
area of effective competition.186
This holding is contradictory to the already settled principle that
consumer welfare as the “unifying goal of antitrust law.”187 By failing to
consider price impacts on consumers, the Ninth Circuit disregarded
established precedent, including statements by the Supreme Court in
Reiter v. Sonotone Corporation.188 Ultimately, the panel turned a blind eye
to landmark cases which delineated that it is appropriate to examine the
impact on consumers when analyzing a Sherman Act Section 2
violation.189
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See Amicus Brief, supra note 2, at 9-10.
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Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2285 (2018)).
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The Ninth Circuit panel’s divergence from precedent in this case has
larger implications because it suggests that “all harms to customers occur
outside the relevant antitrust markets and therefore are never cognizable
under Section 2.”190 The holding disregards and removes impacts to
consumers from a court’s analysis as to whether the challenged conduct
violates antitrust law.191
Even if the Ninth Circuit panel’s holding is read more narrowly, the
implications are still problematic.192 If the holding is read such that
“Qualcomm’s customer-facing patent licensing occurs outside the markets
for modem chip sales and therefore [does] not cause a direct and
cognizable harm in the relevant chip markets,”193 this reading suggests that
the harm Qualcomm caused to its customers was confined to the OEMs. 194
However, the Ninth Circuit excluded the OEMs from the relevant market
for CDMA and premium LTE Modem Chips, stating that they are “outside
the ‘areas of effective competition’ . . . .”195 The panel explained that “ . . .
the district court failed to identify how the policy directly impacted
Qualcomm’s competitors or distorted the area of effective competition.” 196
The panel reasoned that the “no license no chip” policy could not have
harmed competition since the harm was to OEMs that are “outside the
relevant antitrust market.”197 However, the panel’s understanding of what
is required to violate the Sherman Act is not proper: “[a] monopolist need
not aim its anticompetitive conduct directly at competitors to violate the
antitrust laws, so long as the conduct has an exclusionary effect on rivals
in the relevant market.”198
This apparent “directness” test which the Ninth Circuit delineates is
not in accordance with antitrust case law.199 Instead, quite the opposite is
true; for example, previous cases dictate that a monopolist can engage in
anticompetitive conduct, such as exclusion of competitors, “by inflicting
non-price harms on customers, as is the case with tying, coercive exclusive

(1985)); But cf. Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1519-25 (2019) (stating customers
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dealing, and certain most-favored nation clauses.”200 Therefore, the new
test-like requirement for “direct” anti-competitiveness is flawed.201
Regardless of how broadly or narrowly the Ninth Circuit panel’s
holding is interpreted, it illustrates a lack of clarity in the goals and the
application of standards in antitrust law. It is possible that this is a court
stepping away from the consumer welfare standard to what appears to be
a standard focused on competition. Courts are being asked to choose which
standard to apply, and ultimately must choose “among multiple,
incommensurable, and often conflicting values.”202 This makes antitrust
enforcement vulnerable to unfounded decisions that deviate from
precedent and that are more easily influenced by politics.203

B. Competition and Consumers: A Call for Better Debates
Ultimately, current discourse about the goals of antitrust law and the
appropriate enforcement standards do not benefit the antitrust community.
Neither side truly listens nor reflects on the criticisms of the other.
Rather than welcoming the critiques of the standard, supporters of the
consumer welfare approach react harshly to the critiques. The supporters
of the consumer welfare standard often shift the burden of proof to the
critics of the standard, insisting that they produce reliable evidence that
“ . . . (1) market power in the United States has increased, (2) the increase
was the result of lax antitrust enforcement, (3) any enforcement failures
directly resulted from the adoption of the consumer-welfare framework,
and (4) such failures can be corrected only by completely rejecting the
consumer-welfare standard.”204 This is an extremely burdensome standard
of proof which does not contribute to constructive dialogue among either
group of antitrust enthusiasts.205 Even when supporters of the consumer
Id. (referencing Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 498 (1969)
(tying)); Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 152-53 (1951) (conditional
refusal to deal with customers that also work with rivals); United States v. Microsoft Corp,
253 F.3d 34 61-62 (2001) (de facto exclusive dealing).
201
See Amicus Brief, supra note 2, at 16-18.
202
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Standard in Practice 2 (Columbia Law School Scholarship Archive, Working Paper N. 14608, 2018) (citing Ginsburg, Bork’s “Legislative Intent” and the Courts, 79 ANTITRUST
L.J. 941, 950 (2014)), https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2291.
203
See generally Joshua D. Wright, Elyse Dorsey, Jonathan Klick, Jan M. Rybnicek et
al., Requiem for a Paradox: The Dubious Rise and Inevitable Fall of Hipster Antitrust 51
ARIZ. ST. L. J. 293, 351 (2019) (“At its core, the consumer welfare standard provides a
coherent, workable, and objective framework to replace the multiple, and often
contradictory, vague social and political goals that governed antitrust prior to the modern
era.”).
204
Newman, supra note 163, at 70.
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See id.
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welfare standard attempt to respond to direct critiques of the standard, it is
reactionary and unreceptive.206
Supporters of the consumer welfare standard are right in arguing that
impacts on consumers must be considered in evaluating antitrust
violations. The FTC v. Qualcomm decision illustrates the drastic changes
that can occur by solely focusing on competition and completely
discarding consumers from contemplation. It is true that conduct that
increases costs to consumers but nevertheless does not harm competition,
is not considered anticompetitive.207 Thus, harm to consumers cannot be
the only consideration a court addresses. However, that is not what the
consumer welfare standard stands for. The misnomer of “consumer
welfare” has generated confusion because the standard does not solely
focus on consumers.208 Instead, impact on competition must also be
analyzed. Ultimately, both consumers and competition should be
evaluated, and a better verbalization of the standards must be laid out.
Instead of saying that antitrust is solely focused on the welfare of
consumers, we should say that antitrust must balance the procompetitive
justifications with the anticompetitive harm to consumers and to
competition in general.
Rather than shying away from constructive debates, both sides of the
ideological spectrum should take this opportunity to clarify their standards
and to constructively work towards clear policymaking. This does not
mean that both sides need to ultimately agree on an absolute goal of
antitrust. Doing so would be very difficult given the multiplicity of
possible goals to choose from.209 Instead, it means that the unconstructive,
reactionary, and debilitating debate currently in the air is not helpful to the
judiciary in making decisions that have lasting implications.
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PART V: CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the antitrust realm deserves better: better discussions
about goals and standards; better explanations and delineations of such
standards; and better judicial opinions that properly apply the delineated
standards to reach proper antitrust goals, whatever those goals might be.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in FTC v. Qualcomm exemplifies the lack of
cohesiveness and clarity in antitrust goals and standards of analysis. In
determining whether that harm to Qualcomm’s consumers should not be
considered, the court of appeals rejected consumer welfare, which has long
been considered a central premise of antitrust law. To avoid decisions like
this in the future, the current dialogue among antitrust stakeholders must
become more constructive and productive, rather than remain intolerant
and at a standstill. This is a call upon academics, policymakers, and the
judiciary to clarify the standards and engage in more beneficial debates for
the benefit of competition and consumers.

